
1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2	EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
3	SOUTHERN DIVISION
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6	IN RE: AUTOMOTIVE PARTS Master File No. 12-md-02311 ANTITRUST LITIGATION Hon. Marianne O. Battani
7	/ Harring of Baccani
	/
8	
9	SETTLEMENT HEARING
10	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MARIANNE O. BATTANI United States District Judge
11	Theodore Levin United States Courthouse
12	231 West Lafayette Boulevard Detroit, Michigan
13	Wednesday, November 18, 2015
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1	TABLE OF CONTENTS
2	Page
3	Approval of Settlement
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
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17	
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1
     Detroit, Michigan
 2
     Wednesday, November 18, 2015
 3
     At about 3:00 p.m.
 4
 5
               (Court and Counsel present.)
 6
              THE COURT:
                          Good afternoon. This is a nice
 7
     representative group here. Okay. This is the proposed
 8
     settlement final hearing. And, Counsel, may I have your
 9
     appearances, please?
10
              MR. RAITER: Yes, Your Honor. Shawn Raiter on
11
     behalf of the auto dealers.
12
              Your Honor, before you today we have two motions.
13
     The first is for final approval of the collection of
14
     settlements that you have preliminarily approved over the
15
     course of about a year to a year and-a-half. And then the
16
     second is the auto dealers' counsels' request for attorney
17
     fees, reimbursement of litigation expenses, of future
18
     litigation, a reserve fund, and then also service or
19
     incentive awards for the named representatives in the auto
20
     dealer cases.
21
              THE COURT: You know what, I think we should get
22
     defendants' appearances on the record. It is a small group
23
     and I would like to do that formally.
              MR. KONTIO: Peter Kontio for the defendant
24
25
     AutoLiv.
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MS. KINGSLEY: Meredith Kingsley for the defendant

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2
     AutoLiv.
 3
               MR. IWREY:
                          Howard Iwrey for the TRW defendants.
 4
              MR. MAROVITZ: Andy Marovitz for Lear.
 5
               MR. RUBIN:
                          Michael Rubin for Fujikura.
 6
               MR. SANDERS: Parker Sanders for Kungshun Lears
 7
     Sales and Engineering.
               MR. ATKINS: Alden Atkins for Hitachi Automotive
 8
 9
     and the HIAMS defendants.
10
               MS. VAALA: Lindsey Vaala for Hitachi Automotive
11
     and the HIAMS defendants.
12
               MR. SIMMONS: Peter Simmons for the T. Rad
13
     defendants.
14
               MS. DONOVAN: Molly Donovan for the Nippon Seiki
15
     defendants and the Panasonic defendants.
16
               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
17
               MR. JOHNSON: Alan Johnson for the TRW defendants.
18
              MS. FISCHER: Michelle Fischer for the Yazaki
19
     defendants.
               MS. SWANSON: Joanne Geha Swanson for AutoLiv and
20
21
     Fujikura defendants.
22
               THE COURT:
                           Do you want to put your appearance?
23
               MR. FALKENSTEIN: Peter Falkenstein for Kungshun
24
     Lear.
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               THE COURT:
                          Okay. Thank you.
                                              Got everybody.
                                                               With
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you, Mr. Raiter, is Mr. Mantese. Do you want to put your appearance on the record?

MR. MANTESE: Gerard Mantese for the auto
dealerships. Thank you.

MR. RAITER: Thank you, Your Honor. As you know,
we have ten defendants or defendant groups before you with
settlements that you have previously preliminary approved.
The settlements go across 18 different parts cases. They are
broken down into 23 different settlement classes, in other
words, by part or by defendant or by settling defendant
group. The total lump sum cash benefits provided are
approximately $59 million to the auto dealers. These are all
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settlements that are lump sum cash. The defendants have

settlement funds to the auto dealers and so the money has

already changed hands and is sitting there.

already transmitted the funds to trust accounts or qualifying

These again are lump sum cash settlements. There are no reversions, no side pay remainders. These all involve substantial cooperation as Your Honor knows from the preliminary approval hearings.

We received your authorization to send notice to the class and disseminate various forms of notice, we did that -- or to the classes, I should say. We carried out that notice plan. We have as part of final approval papers submitted a declaration from Kenneth Jue from Gilardi and

Company confirming and attesting that the notice plan was carried out. That was a notice plan that ultimately went to about 6,000 automobile dealerships that sell new cars in the indirect purchaser states. That number was a little bit smaller than what we thought we were going to have as part of the preliminary approval. The list available was about 6,000.

We then also sent e-mails that were e-mail addresses associated with new --

THE COURT: I didn't understand that. Is that various people within the dealership?

MR. RAITER: Exactly, yes. So some of these dealerships -- our own class representatives, for example, we know received three or four e-mails of the notice. The way you get those addresses are people sign up or they are part of some trade organization or they go to some conference or something, and so there are groups that sell lists of information, we've all received e-mails I'm sure and you wonder why, but there are these groups out there.

So we had 124,000 e-mail addresses that were associated in some way -- with pretty good knowledge they were associated with automobile dealerships in the indirect purchaser states. We then published notice in Ward's, Auto World, Automotive News and Auto Dealer Monthly. There were social media efforts on Facebook and Twitter. There was a

press release issued as well to try to bring attention to the settlements.

As you saw from the declaration of Kenneth Jue, the notice plan reached approximately 95 percent of new vehicle automobile dealers in the indirect purchaser states.

The class member reaction was excellent. We have no objectors. We have no opt outs. Nobody asked to speak or appear at this hearing. Those of us who do this type of litigation, that's fairly remarkable that we have a nice uniformly supported settlement before you.

THE COURT: There was one who was going to opt out but did not; is that correct?

MR. RAITER: Yes, exactly. There was an automotive dealership group called Group One Automotive who initially opted out. Having considered it further, having spoken with not only counsel for the auto dealers but their own counsel and other people and decided to withdraw that exclusion, which was something that you have allowed in your preliminary approval orders and the notice order, and again that's very common.

If you think about that, just as an aside, what happens in cases like this, there are law firms soliciting opt outs. There are lawyers that go to the big automotive groups, absolutely, the big ones, Auto Nation, Penske, groups like this, all receive multiple letters from law firms

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soliciting them to opt out of these settlements. auto dealer counsel get contacted and we speak with those potential class members about the benefits and the risks and the ups and the downs of these settlements. And having done that in this case, this one group who did elect initially to opt out came back in. So the fact that we don't have any opt outs from any of the large groups or even the small groups is very remarkable and as you know supports the settlement, it is a very strong factor for you. So we didn't have -- because we didn't have objections, we didn't have any objections to the merits of the settlement, the amounts offered, the terms of the settlement, the attorney fees, the requests for reimbursement of expenses or the service or incentive awards or the notice, quite frankly, sometimes people object to the notice plan, we didn't have any such objections here. So, Your Honor, as you know, the 6th Circuit has seven factors that you are to look at as part of final fairness and final approval. I don't think we need to go through all of them here. You are familiar with them. We have briefed them. THE COURT: We have done that before in the preliminary. MR. RAITER: We have. THE COURT: Nothing has changed?

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MR. RAITER: Nothing has changed. I think in summary the important factors are the amount of relief offered here is substantial. It is the result of counsel certainly for the auto dealers but I presume the defendants as well looking at the merits, the risks, the benefits of settling now rather than continuing to litigate, and then also looking at what is actually being provided to these automobile dealerships who come forward and file a claim and ask for some reimbursement. These were certainly arm's-length negotiations. I think you have seen firsthand that the parties are vigorously and zealously representing their clients, so there is no reason to think that any of these settlements were cooked up in some fashion, and they were certainly the result of counsel who were well armed with ample information about the merits, discovery.

As you know, we have not only active discovery going on but we also have cooperation in some of these cases that really does benefit quite a bit the plaintiffs' understanding what is at issue, the conduct, the likely affected commerce and then therefore the merits and weaknesses of our case.

We believe these are excellent settlements, counsel for the auto dealers believe that, we believe these are in the best interest of the classes, and they should be finally approved.

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THE COURT: Is there anyone else who has any input in the settlement beside plaintiffs and defendants? there any third-party financial folks who are involved here? MR. RAITER: Do you mean somebody who has an interest in the settlement like a funding company, is that what you mean? THE COURT: Yes. MR. RAITER: Not from auto dealers' perspective. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. MR. RAITER: These are just the auto dealers and their counsel and the settlements, there's no interest, no one has a share of anything. We have put in front of you, Your Honor, four plans of allocation that were developed by Stuart Rosenthal, who was the special allocation consultant that the auto dealers engaged with the Court's approval. He has spent a great deal of time trying to devise plans that fairly distribute the money that is available in each one of these settlement funds, and essentially the approach he came up with was a weighted point system where he gives more weight to vehicles where we have good evidence of coordination, and when I say good evidence it isn't always perfect given where we are in the litigation and just quite frankly the nature of the evidence we receive often says somebody might have met and might have talked about this particular model, or it could

have been this model or that model, so it isn't always perfect, but where we think we have pretty good evidence of a particular model being part of some coordinated activity, Mr. Rosenthal has given that model the highest weighting possible.

And so a dealership will come in then and have a claim form, which we have submitted to the Court as part of the Jue declaration, and will tell us in each year how many units of a particular model did they sell. Those units will then be applied to the weighting or scoring system. So you get the highest amount for a model that we have good evidence that was coordinated, and you then get a lesser amount for the next three model years of that model. The idea being these parts sometimes span three or four years, so let's say a 2010 Camry was coordinated, a wire harness that goes into that Camry may be in the 2011, 2012, 2013 model years as well, so that's the next highest weighting.

Again, the evidence isn't always perfect here. Sometimes the defendants will say we sold these wire harnesses, we are not entirely sure what model years they went into or even what models they went into, they think they know but they don't always.

So the next step then is weighting OEMs who were targets of coordination and then beneath that any other vehicles. So he's got a graduated kind of weighting system

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that is intended to provide more relief to automobile dealers who sold more vehicles that we believe were coordinated.

He also has a system for assigning points to the parts because if you remember the component parts for repairs or other uses are also at issue in these particular settlements before Your Honor. These were cases that involved parts allegations and the releases that are before the Court involved parts, so he has allocated certain weighting to parts as well.

In order to be sure that we don't overburden these dealers in trying to prove to us which parts they bought because it is not exactly easy sometimes with the different part numbers and identification numbers for different types of wire harnesses, as an example, so what we did there is he looked at it and decided that the idea would be that you can use the volume of your vehicle sales for purchases as a surrogate for parts. In other words, a large dealership that purchases a lot of these vehicles is likely to also purchase a lot of the parts, so that's an option that the class members have is to essentially say I don't want to submit my parts invoices as part of my proof of claim, what I just want you to do is rely on my vehicle purchase numbers as a If they do choose to come in with their actual parts purchase information that's what will be used in the weighting process.

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So we have submitted some case law, Your Honor,
that says that your analysis of these plans of allocation is
essentially the same, it is the same standard as Rule 23,
which is are they fair, reasonable and adequate under the
circumstances. We believe these plans are.
                                             The plans that
we provided to you so far are the wire harness, the occupant
safety systems, inverters and switches. The reason you don't
have all of them in front of you is that some information is
still coming in, so to speak, with some of these other parts,
and the plans are still being essentially put together.
         The case law when we came to you on preliminary
approval is pretty clear that you can enter final judgment
without having any plan of allocation before you, and you can
let the parties come back later and propose those.
                     Explain to me a little bit more about
         THE COURT:
what happens -- I see the claims form that the auto dealers
have to fill out and they mail this claims form into --
         MR. RAITER:
                      Gilardi.
         THE COURT: -- Gilardi, and Gilardi has a facility
that can handle all of these, and will Gilardi be the ones to
apply these plans?
         MR. RAITER: Yes.
                    And then disburse the funds?
         THE COURT:
         MR. RAITER: Yes, yes.
         THE COURT:
                     Okay.
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MR. RAITER: So they will be the claims administrator as well with the Court's approval, and we have that in the proposed omnibus order that I presented to you. The process is also now available electronically so they don't have to just mail it in, they can fill out a form electronically and submit it. We have asked them to back up their data or their claim with their year-end OEM statements, which defendants are familiar with what those are, it is essentially at the end of the year or actually at the end of each month a dealer submits to the OEM kind of a breakdown of what we purchased, what we sold. So those are documents that are already in existence for most dealerships, they should be accessible for most dealerships, and that's what they can submit to say I bought 1,000 Corollas, here is my OEM statement that shows that I did. We will accept other documentation as well if there is something else that the dealership has that is good

We will accept other documentation as well if there is something else that the dealership has that is good evidence that they actually purchased those vehicles or purchased those parts.

What Gilardi will then do is by the end of the claims deadline — or at the end of the claims deadline will essentially calculate all of these weighted scores for each of these different parts and will assign the dealership some kind of a score for its claim. From there you then are going to make a pro-rata distribution of the particular settlement

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fund to those dealers that have made claims to that fund
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     based on their weighted score.
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              THE COURT: So none of this is done, as I
     understand it, until the very end, so that's why you end up
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 5
     with no -- I mean, you know you are distributing everything?
 6
              MR. RAITER: Correct, we are going to put it all
 7
     out, right.
                  So the claims process is just getting underway,
 8
     and we will obviously make efforts to be sure that the
 9
     dealers are aware that the process is underway, that they
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     make their claims, that they receive assistance in perfecting
11
     their claims. We have every incentive to get that money paid
12
     out to the right people at the right time.
13
              THE COURT: Okay. And you indicated in your
14
     settlement -- or in your papers that there is a minimum of
15
     350 --
16
              MR. RAITER: $350, yes.
                         -- that the auto dealership will get?
17
              THE COURT:
18
              MR. RAITER: Correct.
19
                           So at the end, what I wasn't quite
              THE COURT:
20
     clear about, if the dealership does not make any claim at all
21
     then they wouldn't even be entitled to that or would you
22
     automatically send --
23
                           It has to be a perfected claim form.
              MR. RAITER:
24
     Keep in mind that some of these class periods start at
25
     different times or that certain vehicles may have been
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coordinated at different times, and if you are an auto dealer that went out of the business before then or just came into business after that you may not have a valid claim based on timing, so we really do need to see a claim come in from somebody that gives us the time frame, gives us the backup documents.

Mr. Rosenthal came up with the \$350 minimum payment essentially as an incentive for people to think to themselves it is worth my time to fill this out, to have somebody at my dealership to fill this form out and go through this process.

THE COURT: And what about like during the recession and when the companies went out of the business and all of these auto dealerships that I've read about, I don't know, that went out of the business, what about those dealerships?

MR. RAITER: Yes, I should have said this. The notice plan that the 6,000 postal addresses and even the e-mail addresses included dealerships that were once in business and may no longer be in business. So we made an effort to reach out to those dealerships because they would have a claim here. Now, how it is presented and who actually holds the claim and all of those fun things are a different issue for the claim process, but certainly if a dealership went out of the business but was in business for the first half of the particular class period they would in theory have

a claim and could bring the claim forward and show that they are the right person who owns the claim, so to speak, or is authorized to bring the claim. So we have -- no one is excluded on that basis, you do not still have to be in business to file a claim.

So, Your Honor, we have asked you in the omnibus order before the Court to approve these plans of allocation that you have before you, and we recognize that for any future part and future plans of allocation we will need to come to the Court and get approval for those and we intend to do so as quickly as we possibly can.

One thing I should have mentioned is that we also propose in this allocation plan through Mr. Rosenthal, it was really his idea, which was a very good one, which is to put some money into reserve for some period of time from each one of these funds. The idea being is we may not have all of the information right now about particular models or particular coordination and we don't want to dole all of the money out only to find out later that there was some model that was affected and we didn't account for that properly. So he has proposed that we set aside via Gilardi and these qualified settlement funds 40 percent initially to sit and to be sure that we have the ability to essentially direct the money to the right people at the right time. As these cases unfold, wire harness is farthest advanced, it may be that we come to

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the Court and we say we believe we have the information, we would like permission to disburse what we have in reserve, if that makes sense. THE COURT: So you are going to be doing basically two disbursements, or 60 percent of the fund now and then 40 percent at a later date if it is still there? MR. RAITER: Exactly, exactly, yep, because we want to treat everyone fairly and because the litigation continues there may be new information that is material. It may turn out that it really isn't and that we have covered it adequately in the plans as they are approved, and if so you would run that 40 percent back through those class members the same way you did the first 60 percent. THE COURT: So in terms of distribution you're asking to take out 40 percent of the fund and then I know you are asking for five percent for future costs, and then the reimbursement for costs and the attorney fees? MR. RAITER: Uh-huh. THE COURT: What do you see as the net amount that is ready to be distributed roughly? That's a good question. I haven't MR. RAITER: done that calculation. The 40 percent may be soon. we just wanted to be absolutely sure that we didn't have

something that shocked us later and said we didn't know about

this and now we need to add these vehicles in. So we are

trying to work as quickly as possible to get claims paid because the money is just sitting there and it should get in the right hands as soon as we can, so I haven't done that calculation but that would be the idea.

We have, as you know, we have Sumitomo, the motion before Your Honor, at least it has been briefed, we have a settlement with Sumitomo for preliminary approval, and there may be some other settlements relatively soon, so we will be adding hopefully to these funds essentially as we go is our hope.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RAITER: At least as to the final approval aspect of this settlement, Your Honor, or these settlements, we have submitted to you a set of orders. The first is what I have called the omnibus order, and that's an order that would apply across all these settlements and has the various Rule 23 findings, has the appointment of settlement counsel, the appointment of the class representatives, it has the approval of the plans of allocation and approval of the notice plan, et cetera.

What we have then done with each of the defendant groups is circulate and I think approve final orders for judgment for each of these defendant groups. There is an exception or two, one might have more than another -- or one may have two of these orders for judgment, and then the Lear

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and Kale Sales are put together into one document, but the idea would be that we would ask you to enter some kind of an omnibus order hopefully like the form we have proposed to you which also includes defendants' comments and edits. That. particular omnibus order I will need to submit a very, very slightly amended version to the Court to clean up some case number and ECF number mistakes, and then also on paragraph 44 we inadvertently said that we had the starters plan of allocation before you when, in fact, we have the switches. Defense counsel I believe has signed off on that omnibus order, I'm not suggesting that they joined in it, but they have had the opportunity to submit edits, comments and what we will submit to you today is hopefully something that will be to your approval. Each of their orders for judgment they have essentially signed off on. We have asked for their input. They look very much the same, there are a few little differences among them, but we'll submit to the Court all of those orders which then direct the entry of final judgment as to these defendant groups. THE COURT: So you are going to submit, just so I'm clear on this, a whole new set, let's say, of orders, so that I will know these will be the final --MR. RAITER: Exactly. THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RAITER: I will try to not have a bunch of things going different ways but they are very, very minor changes, one to paragraph 44, one to some ECF and case number citations for the HIAMS or Hitachi Group that we got wrong when we submitted the proposed order.

So the second order before Your Honor is a request for reimbursement of costs, disbursements, future litigation fund, attorney fees and service or incentive awards. As you know, you have the ability under Rule 23(h) and 54(d)(2) to award fees and reimbursement of expenses to the auto dealers. Again, we don't have any objections or comments to the fees that we have requested, the reimbursement. We posted that motion several weeks before the opt out or the objection deadline. We filed it with the Court, put it up on the settlement website in case anyone wanted to comment before they had to object or opt out.

The methodology for our calculations in our request, so you have an idea of what we did, I think we spelled it out but I want to be clear, we submitted to you the Loadstar for the cases in which we have settlements before the Court. We also submitted what each of our firms essentially call a general auto parts file, and those files are files essentially that reflect the work that is done that benefits all of this -- all of these cases and all of this litigation. When we come to a status conference we don't

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come for only wire harness, we come for all of the cases.
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     When we work with some of our experts we work for all of the
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     cases rather than any particular case at times. What we have
     done as lead counsel is directed our auto dealer counsel to
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 5
     try to attribute time and expenses as best possible to a
 6
     particular case or to a particular part so that we are
 7
     tracking that time and that investment and those fee requests
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     when we come to you based on the settlements.
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              THE COURT: So the 41,000 hours you are talking
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     about -- yeah, 41,000, relate to these parts only and they
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     have been pulled out from --
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              MR. RAITER: Correct.
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              THE COURT:
                         -- all of the parts?
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              MR. RAITER: With the exception of the general
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            Again, if I come to a status conference I would put my
     time.
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     time down as auto parts general because I'm here for not just
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     wire harness but all of the other cases.
                                                So the 41,000 hours
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     includes what we have deemed general billing that would apply
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     across the litigation.
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              THE COURT: So it won't be duplicated in the next?
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              MR. RAITER: Absolutely not, and that's what we are
22
     trying to be clear about is we have a system in place so we
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     know what our time and expenses are.
                                            You will know what fees
24
     you have awarded or what expenses you have awarded.
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directed our people when we made the preliminary -- excuse

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me, the filing for the motion for attorney fees and expenses we basically said okay, now we need to draw a line because we need to know what expenses are incurred going forward, we need to know what time is incurred going forward because if we are fortunate enough to get an attorney fee award from you today or shortly hereafter we know that we can't come back in and double dip and ask for the same time again. So what we would probably intend to do is come in and say here is our time on these cases where we have settlements again, here is the aggregate amount of time and expense, here is what you have already awarded and here is the difference, that seems to be the only way we can think of to do this because the litigation continues.

So, again, the time before you has parts' specific time for each part involved in the settlements, those cases will continue against other defendants, and there will be time spent there, and then we will have the general time where it benefits more than one case essentially, so that was the methodology. Again, we don't have any objections to any aspect of this request.

We have requested reimbursement for past expenses as of essentially the beginning of October, incurred of \$1,661,946 that counsel for the auto dealers have advanced from their firms to benefit these settlement class members.

We asked for the establishment of a future expense fund. As

you know from the case law, the Packaged Ice and the Manual for Complex Litigation, and I believe you also did it for the direct purchasers in this litigation as well, setting aside some money from these settlements to pursue the claims in the parts cases at issue here. So I want to be very clear about this; the settlement fund here if we don't have a settlement in bearings, which we don't have before you, the fund that we have before you would not be used for the bearings litigation because that would not be fair to those settlement class members, so we would use this future fund only for the parts cases at issue before you, the 18 different parts that we have. So, again, we are trying to be sensitive to where the money should be used and how.

We have asked for five percent of the gross settlement funds, which would be \$2,947,395, as a future litigation fund. That would be something that we would obviously keep records for, both what is in the fund, what goes out of the fund, how it was spent, and certainly if the Court had questions as we proceed we would be happy to provide accountings to you as we go.

We have asked for an award of attorney fees.

Again, interim fee awards as the litigation continues are well accepted, the Air Cargo case, the Diet Drugs case, Your Honor awarded fees to the direct purchasers in this litigation as well.

We ask that you apply a percentage of the fund approach which is favored in the 6th Circuit. What we have asked for is one-third of the net settlement funds remaining after the deduction of two things, and that is the cost of notice and settlement administration, which we estimate at about \$500,000, and then after the future litigation costs set aside the 2.947 million. So, in other words, we are not asking to take a fee off of those things, we don't believe what -- we are not asking for that.

So the calculation as we see it is \$58,947,900 is the gross amount of the settlement funds. You would take away \$2,947,395 for the five-percent litigation fund set aside, and you would also then remove \$500,000 for settlement claims notice and administration. You would take that number and divide it by three, and this is in my declaration that supports the fee request, that would leave \$18,500,168 for attorney fees. If you looked at that instead of being one-third of the fund minus those deductions, if you looked at it instead as what percentage of this -- is this of the gross settlement funds it would be 31.38 percent.

The Loadstar cross check on this, you've already mentioned the 41,000 hours of attorney time, 6,000 hours approximately of paralegal/law clerk/professional staff time, the Loadstar total is approximately \$26.1 million as of about the beginning of October. If you were to award the fee

request of 18,500,000 that would be a 0.70 Loadstar, it would be a negative multiplier, and that's simply the product of litigating these cases for three and-a-half years and the amount of the settlement that we have before you or the settlements we have before you, so we are not asking for a positive multiplier, in fact, it would be a negative multiplier. And if we were to come forward again for a request for fees we would obviously do the accounting for you so we can give you a big-picture view of multipliers, negative-positive disbursements as we need to have a good accounting for that as we go.

Finally, Your Honor, the service awards we have requested for the auto dealers are \$50,000 each for those who are named representatives in the operative complaints. As you know from the Haddocks and other cases in the 6th Circuit, these fees or awards are intended to encourage people or businesses to come forward to serve in these roles and to also recognize their efforts, their service and their commitment to bringing cases to a conclusion.

I think you're pretty familiar with the amount of discovery that has been directed to the auto dealers. It has been daunting for many of them. We have produced, for example, or been asked to produce invoices for all the purchases of cars going back to 1998 to the present. For some dealers that is tens of thousands of vehicles at issue.

We have also asked to produce certain electronic DM'S data.

We have been asked to produce certain incentive and other documents from the OEMs or to and from the OEMs.

THE COURT: How many of these representative dealerships do you have?

MR. RAITER: I don't -- we have a couple that are a little bit in limbo, as you know. We have got one that has been allowed to move out of the case, Holdsbower. We have two motions for dealerships that would like to be out of the litigation, so it is in the low 40s, less than 45 and more than 40.

The reason for that -- this is an interesting issue because if we were to come in often with a dealer who purports to represent people from a state other than the one in which they reside, we often get a motion from the defendants saying you have to have a dealership representative in each state. So in order to carry out litigation like this on a nationwide basis we have to have that many dealers in order to not have this argument advanced. We don't agree with the argument but that's the reason you do it.

So we would ask Your Honor that you award that amount to these dealers. It is well supported in the case law. Again, we have cited 6th Circuit District Court cases like the Liberty Capital which was \$97,000 and \$95,000;

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     Cardizem, which was $75,000 for each class representative,
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     that was a 2003 decision; Revco Securities Litigation, which
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     is Northern District of Ohio in 1992 awarded $200,000.
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                           So how did you come up with $50,000?
               THE COURT:
                                                                  Ι
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     shouldn't have asked that question.
 6
                            You try to use your best judgment
               MR. RAITER:
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     based on the results, based on the amount of effort.
 8
     dealerships obviously are still facing additional discovery,
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     they have depositions that they will have to sit for, and so
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     it is kind of we believe supported by the case law and
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     supported by where we are at right now in the litigation.
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     that's how we got there. There is no magic to it.
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     this is in your discretion; the attorney fees, the
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     reimbursement of the expenses, the incentive awards are all
     up to Your Honor's good judgment.
15
16
               We have submitted a proposed order for the attorney
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     fees and expenses. Again, I will circulate that as part of
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     this e-mail back to the Court so you have that handy, but we
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     ask that you make these awards. Unless you have questions
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     I'm happy to pass the microphone.
21
               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
22
               MR. RAITER: Thank you.
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                           Defense, anyone want to speak?
               THE COURT:
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               MR. IWREY:
                           Your Honor, I have a very brief
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     housekeeping issue.
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
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               MR. IWREY:
                           Could I clarify, Your Honor, one thing
 3
     with Mr. Raiter before that?
               (An off-the-record discussion was held at
 4
 5
               3:10 p.m.)
 6
                           Your Honor, Howard Iwrey on behalf of
               MR. IWREY:
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     the TRW defendants, and also speaking on behalf of the
 8
     AutoLiv defendants.
 9
               First of all, the clarification that I wanted to
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     make was that 16,000 notices were mailed out, not 6,000 as
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     Mr. Raiter stated.
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               THE COURT:
                          Right.
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               MR. IWREY:
                          Which is even better.
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               THE COURT:
                          Yes.
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                           What I wanted to point out, Mr. Raiter
               MR. IWREY:
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     mentioned to you that some of the defendants' specific
     proposed judgments have slightly different provisions.
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                                                               The
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     provisions in AutoLiv and TRW have slightly different
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     provisions.
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               As you recall at the last hearing in September when
     the Court approved dissemination of the dealer notices, I
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     said that TRW and AutoLiv have a motion pending in the Rush
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     Trucks case that could relate to this settlement we think in
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     a very small way. The dealer proposed orders for TRW and
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     AutoLiv do make reference to that motion, and that motion is
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     ECF Number 7 in the Rush Trucks case, which is 15-cv-12050.
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              Your Honor, that motion is pending, fully briefed
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     and ready for oral argument, and we would suggest that the
     Court consider ruling on the motion promptly so that the
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     claims administration process in the dealers' case can
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     proceed smoothly. And we are happy to speak with Rush, I
 7
     don't believe counsel for Rush Trucks is here, but we are
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     happy to speak with Rush's counsel and your chambers so we
 9
     can set up a hearing date on that.
10
              THE COURT:
                           Would that hearing date be set up
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     for -- we have a conference in December, right?
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              MR. IWREY:
                          I believe it is January 9th.
13
              THE COURT:
                          You want it before that?
14
              MR. IWREY:
                          If possible.
15
              THE COURT:
                           Okay.
16
              MR. IWREY:
                          Okay.
                                 Thank you very much, Your Honor.
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              MR. RAITER: Mr. Iwrey was correct about the
     number, it was approximately 16,000 direct mailings.
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19
              THE COURT:
                           I have that in my notes.
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              MR. RAITER: And we did agree on the language in
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     their final order and judgment and so I don't have anything
22
     further on that.
23
              THE COURT:
                           Okay. Anyone else have any comment?
24
               (No response.)
25
              THE COURT: No other comments. Okay.
                                                       I would like
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to rule on these things right now so we can proceed. Okay. We have got a -- the motion is for, I believe, ten previously-approved settlements with certain defendants in this MDL involving 18 of the component parts. I'm not going to list the defendants but we all know who they are.

First of all, we have the notice and as we have just discussed there were 16,000 actual mailings as I understand it in addition to 124,000 e-mails to addresses associated with these dealerships, and finally, of course, we have the notices as counsel indicated that were published, and we have the website. So I think that the notice plan which is alleged to have reached 95 percent of the eligible automotive dealers worked out very well. I think that's a tremendous number of dealerships to have reached.

I am somewhat amazed that we haven't gotten any more objections but today is the date set, it was in the notice and we don't have any other objections except for the one that was withdrawn, and I think that does speak to the reasonableness of the settlement.

We have Mr. Rosenthal's plan of allocation. I cannot speak as to how that plan will work, but I believe he is experienced in allocating things such as this and that the plan for allocation sounds fair and reasonable and adequate to give weight appropriately to the various dealerships.

The issue of whether the proposed settlement is

fair, reasonable and adequate, the Court, of course, has gone over this in the preliminary rulings, and there are any number of items that have to be taken into consideration and we dealt with these before but I will simply touch on them. The likelihood of success, I guess that's disputed between the parties but the settlement resolves that. The likelihood of success on these indirect purchasers are -- is a little risky and therefore that has to be taken into consideration. There is also the value that has been discussed before as to icebreaker settlements.

The next issue is the complexity, expense and duration of continued litigation. Certainly we know antitrust cases in themselves, at least in my experience, are complex. I think this case has many unique twists and is a very complex case that could go on and may for some parts and some defendants a very long time at a great expense. I think we can see the expenses that have already been incurred to proceed with this litigation.

Another factor is the judgment of experienced counsel and I have addressed this before, I think both by reviewing the resumes of counsel involved here and by judging the work that has been done and the pleadings and the briefs that have been submitted and in observing counsel in court, the Court finds that settlement counsel is very experienced and well able to evaluate the strengths and the weaknesses of

the claims and defenses that exist in this case, and I believe that counsel believes the settlement is fair, reasonable and in the best interest of the settlement class.

Another item is the reaction of class members and, of course, we have already touched on that that there has been basically with one exception no input from class members. The settlement class counsel have negotiated this the Court believes at arm's length.

Another factor is the public interest and of course the settlement of complex litigation such as this conserves judicial resources and that's in the best interest of the public but also it is important for the public to see a result which is determined to be fair and reasonable given the nature of this litigation.

The Court -- well, we know the notice sent out was the notice proper. The Court reviewed the notice and it does seem that the notice covered all of the issues that would come up and well informed the recipients of what was going on. I did think -- I want to comment on this. I thought that was very good in the notice where you talked about what does it mean to me, how do I do this, et cetera. I thought that there was plain English, plain English used, which kind of surprised me with your hourly rates that you could come down to such plain language.

And the next issue is should the settlement class

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be certified for purposes of effectuating the proposed settlement. We have gone through this before when we talked about the classes -- the proposed classes. There is numerosity, clearly we know there is numerosity by the number of notices that had to go out. There is commonality, questions of law and fact common to the whole class. is typicalities, the claims of the respective parties are typical of the claims in this antitrust of each and every person or entity, and the injuries also affect each member in the same way. There is adequacy of representation, and the Court has already addressed the qualifications of counsel and the qualifications of the representative dealerships, plaintiffs' counsel has referenced those dealerships and what they had to go through, and they are representative of all of the dealerships. We know that common questions predominate over questions affecting only individuals and would satisfy Rule 23(b)(3). The next issue is whether the plan of allocation and settlement class and auto dealer class should be approved, and the Court has indicated that the plan of allocation pleadings appear to it to be a fair and adequate plan, and that the counsel -- the Court will appoint counsel to represent the settlement class and also appoint the auto dealers -- or approve of the auto dealers' class representatives.

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So the Court will approve the settlement in these actions with the plan of allocation, however, only for the four parts that were submitted to the Court.

The next issue has to do with the funds -- multiple issues with the fund. There is a request to set aside 40 percent of the fund for future and unknown, I guess I should say, items that might come up to be resolved. The Court will approve that 40 percent at this time, and it would be held but I hope distributed as soon as possible.

The request for reimbursement for past expenses. The Court has been looking at the expenses amongst various parts as they have been submitted basically quarterly these past years. You know there are expenses that I have no way of knowing. You charge for travel and, you know, I don't know if you are staying at the Ritz or Motel 6, I mean, I have no way of knowing that. But I think when a court appoints a group of attorneys such as I have here we depend on your own credibility and honesty, and I have no intention of delving into these individual expenses regardless of the multitude of expenses for various people and entities, experts, document reviews, the hosting of the papers, the computer systems, et cetera. The Court will approve the \$1,661,946.95 for the expenditures.

I stop to say this because the last conference I went to they delved into these expenses and had \mbox{CPAs} -- a

number of the MDLs had CPAs appointed to look at these expenses, but when I look at the cost of hiring such folks versus the cost of the expenses I think I'm going with your honesty on the expenses, so that's basically where I come down on that issue.

We know that we have only 18 parts here and only some of the defendants so the Court does agree with the future litigation expenses, that's that five percent that has been requested, and I think that comes to \$2,947,395 for future expenses against the non-settling defendants, and I think that that is very fair and it is fair to the individual plaintiffs because they are continuing their litigation against these defendants and therefore should share in these costs.

In terms of the service award for the dealership representatives, the request is for 50,000 with somewhere between 40 and 45 dealership representatives. I think that's a fair number considering all of the state issues that we have. Whether \$50,000 is adequate is really like pulling numbers out of the air based on educated guesses, and I think given the number of years and the amount of work -- as I understand it there is some 700,000 pages of documents that have been gotten from the dealer representatives, and depositions to come, so the Court is going to award the \$50,000.

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The next issue, which is probably the most difficult, is the question of attorney fees where the Court looks at a number of approaches. There is the percentage of the fund approach, the Loadstar approach, what is that third one called, the percent -- the Loadstar percentage that is frequently used or called Loadstar crosscheck. The Court did a number of things. Let me tell you, first of all, I considered the fact that I am told there's 41,000 attorney hours and 6,000 paralegal hours or clerk hours, assuming though I know you all work much more than this, just to eyeball this, that you work 1,500 hours a year, and for 41,000 hours I basically get 27.3 attorneys and this is for over four years, so it will equal out to be roughly 6.8 attorneys a year. That doesn't seem to be enough at all. But anyway those hours which looking at them in and of themself are somewhat staggering but when you consider it is over four years in all of this complex litigation the Court is just taking an eyeball figure to say is that a reasonable number of hours for attorneys to work, and I think in this case it certainly is. In terms of the approach to this, whether the Loadstar or percentage as between those two approaches, the Loadstar I think is a much more difficult approach to take.

One, you get into the hourly rate, and I think some of these

them I guess that's more power to you, but I would have a very difficult time looking at the specific hours and applying the hourly rates that have been submitted to the Court.

But what I did do, if I can find it here, is I looked at a blended rate, and when I look at the blended rate by taking the amount requested here, the 18 some million, divided by the 47,000 hours, that's adding both the attorneys and the paralegals, I get a \$393 an hour blended rate. If I take just the attorney, the 41,000 hours, I get a \$451 blended rate, and I think that that blended rate is a reasonable hourly rate with some attorneys with more experience obviously getting more and some less.

The Loadstar in this case is 26.1 million, I believe, and the requested fee is \$18,500,158, which counsel has indicated is that multiplier of 0.70, which is a negative multiplier, which are generally considered reasonable and appropriate, so that crosscheck I think works out well.

The Court has to weigh a number of factors in the fee award; one, the value of the benefits to the class. We know here that the class, of course, is getting fair cash settlement plus cooperation as to against the other defendants. The society benefits by awarding reasonable attorney fees because this does encourage the bringing of suits and the ending of these antitrust transgressions. And

the Court also notes that in this case specifically the Department of Justice has received I think it is \$2.6 billion, something like that, \$2.9 billion in fines but they did not seek any restitution, none of that is for restitution. I also consider the fact that these cases are worked on a contingent basis, and certainly there is a risk of non-recovery specifically for indirect plaintiffs.

The complexity of the litigation. As the Court has referenced already, it is very complex, multiple classes, number of parts, multiple defendants. I mean, everything is complex, even the fact that it goes across countries and has various languages, it just keeps going. And we know, as the Court has referenced before, that the skill of counsel is extremely competent and very experienced.

So the Court in considering all of this in trying to figure out the best way to determine the attorney fees and considering the numbers that come out when you look at the Loadstar and the crosscheck, finds that the requested amount of the attorneys' fees, which is, I believe -- you said it and I don't remember, it is just under a third, maybe 31 percent, the Court will award that. I find that it is a fair, reasonable and adequate sum. Okay.

Okay. What did I forget? Plaintiff, you're going to present all of the orders to the Court, and I will sign it, and then you will work as fast as you can in getting

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     these other settlements.
                               If at all possible we can --
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              MR. RAITER: We will, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: -- get them together.
              MR. RAITER: Yes.
                                  I know that this is off the
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     topic, but the Sumitomo preliminary approval that the
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     indirect purchasers, so the end payors and auto dealers have
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     submitted to the Court, we had called at one time trying to
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     schedule a hearing and we had a phone issue where we didn't
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     get with your assistant to get it scheduled, so I think that
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     would be one that we would want to get on for preliminary
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     approval hearing no later than the January conference, but if
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     there was another hearing for something else we might ask to
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     join in before that.
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              THE COURT:
                         Okay. You wanted another hearing for
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     the settlement --
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              MR. RAITER: You have preliminary approval, this is
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     not part of the final approval, but the Sumitomo settlement
     between the end payors and the auto dealers have been fully
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19
     briefed and submitted for preliminary approval.
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     dealers were willing to forego a hearing, and my
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     understanding is either and/or Sumitomo and the indirects
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     would like to have a hearing, so we tried to schedule it by
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     having a call, the call had a glitch, we didn't get on the
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     phone with Your Honor's chambers, so that's just hanging out
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     there, but that would be another one that we should try to
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     move forward so we can get it to a final approval at some
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     point.
 3
               THE COURT: Okay. We will work on a date and let
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     you know if we can get that in in the next month.
 5
               MR. RAITER: Thank you, Your Honor.
 6
               THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?
 7
               (No response.)
 8
               THE COURT: Thank you, and I wish you all a very
 9
     happy Thanksgiving.
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               THE LAW CLERK: All rise. Court is in recess.
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               (Proceedings concluded at 3:35 p.m.)
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1 CERTIFICATION 2 3 I, Robert L. Smith, Official Court Reporter of 4 the United States District Court, Eastern District of 5 Michigan, appointed pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, 6 United States Code, Section 753, do hereby certify that the 7 foregoing pages comprise a full, true and correct transcript 8 taken in the matter of In re: Automotive Parts Antitrust 9 Litigation, Case No. 12-02311, on Wednesday, 10 November 18, 2015. 11 12 13 s/Robert L. Smith Robert L. Smith, RPR, CSR 5098 14 Federal Official Court Reporter United States District Court 15 Eastern District of Michigan 16 17 18 Date: 12/17/2015 19 Detroit, Michigan 20 21 22 23 24 25